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COMMENT
IMPLEMENTING POLICY OBJECTIVES IN THE
TAXATION OF DEFERRED
COMPENSATION
ARRANGEMENTS
Over the years, the nonqualified deferred compensation arrange-
ment has become a much-used tool in the hands of the executive and
his tax planner.' By resort to such an arrangement, the executive can
delay payment of part or all of his current compensation until his in-
come and tax brackets are lower. The highly paid corporate executive
thereby incurs a smaller tax and thus realizes a tax savings at the ex-
pense of the rest of the taxpaying public. Yet a fundamental assump-
tion of tax reform generally, as well as the underlying principle of
progressive taxation itself, is that wealth should be redistributed down-
ward.2
THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS NOTE:
SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, REPORT ON THE REVENUE ACT OF 1978, H.R. 13511, S. REP.
No. 1263, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1978] 9 FED. TAXES (P-H) % 60,611, Rep. Bull. 43,
section 2 (separate booklet) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. ON H.R. 13511];
HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, REPORT ON THE REVENUE ACT OF 1978, H.R. 13511,
H.R. REP. No. 1445, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1978] 9 FED. TAXES (P-H) 60,489, Rep.
Bull. 35, section 2 (separate booklet) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. ON H.R. 13511];
SENATE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE, REPORT ON TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969, S. REP. No. 552,
91st Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1969] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2027 [hereinafter cited as
1969 S. REP.];
G. WASHINGTON & V. ROTHSCHILD, COMPENSATING THE CORPORATE EXECUTIVE (3d ed.
1962) [hereinafter cited as WASHINGTON & ROTHSCHILD];
McDonald, Deferred Compensation: Conceptual Astigmatism, 24 TAX L. REV. 201 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as McDonald];
Metzer, Constructive Receipt, Economic Benoft and Assignment ofIncome: A Case Study in
Deferred Compensation, 29 TAX L. REV. 524 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Metzer].
1. See generaloy T. PATTEN, PAY: EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND INCENTIVE PLANS 504-06
(1977); 1 WASHINGTON & ROTHSCHILD 106-64; Lasser & Rothschild, Deferred Compensation/or
Executives, 33 HARV. BUS. REV. 89 (1955).
2. See H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 8-12 (1969), reprintedin [1969] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1645, 1653-56. "Tax reform is necessary both to be sure that those with
substantially the same incomes are paying substantially the same tax and also [sic] to make sure
that the graduated income tax structure is working fairly as between different income levels."
H.R. REP. No. 413, supra at 10, reprinted in [1969] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1645, 1654.
The 1969 House report also discussed problems of taxpayer morale, noting that "[t]he fact that
1460
Vol. 78:1460] DEFERRED COMPENSATION TAXATION 1461
The deferred compensation plan ideally is intended as a device for
retirement planning; however, in the context of the nonqualified plan,
the primary goal is often tax avoidance.3 The nonqualified plan exists
essentially for the employer who wishes to favor his top executives and
for the key employee whose compensation goals exceed those secured
by the qualified plan.4 While the availability of nonqualified deferred
compensation arrangements may be a desirable thing from certain
standpoints, there are policy considerations that would indicate that a
restrictive treatment of such arrangements is in order.
In February 1978, a treasury regulation was proposed that would
have had a substantial effect on the future availability of executive de-
ferred compensation arrangements.5  The proposed regulation pro-
vided that any amount of compensation income deferred at the option
of the individual entitled to receive it was to be reportable in the year in
which such amount would have been received but for the agreement
stipulating a later date for payment.' Because the proposed regulation
would have eliminated a great many executive deferred compensation
plans, reaction on the part of the business community was predictably
adverse. When the Treasury Department sought legislative authority
for the proposed change, Congress acted on behalf of the business com-
munity to defeat the proposal outright and without compromise.7
present law permits a small minority of high-income individuals to escape tax on a large propor-
tion of their income has seriously undermined the feeling of taxpayers that others are paying their
fair share of the tax burden." Id That these problems are still with us today is evidenced by the
results of a recent Roper survey released in July, 1978. The survey indicates "that the American
public considers tax reform the third most pressing national problem ranking behind only control-
ling inflation and lowering the crime rate. And significantly, tax reform to the Roper respondents
is equated much more frequently with tax fairness [than] with tax reductions." Revenue Act of
1978: Hearings on H.R. 13511 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1978)
(statement of See'y of the Treas. Michael Blumenthal), reprinted in Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) J-I
(Aug. 17, 1978). As one author has noted: "Though the debate over tax reform deals extensively
with economic policy considerations, the movement's 'gut issue' is equity in taxation, or more
specifically, redistribution of income to provide greater equality in after-tax income." R. FREE-
MAN, TAX LOOPHOLES 36 (1973). See I WASHINGTON & ROTHSCHILD 161-62; Eisenstein, A Case
of Deferred Compensation, 4 TAx L. REv. 391, 400 (1949). For a further discussion of this and
related issues, see text accompanying note 86 infra.
3. Commentators often talk in terms of providing incentives for the executive. However, it
is the tax saving made possible by the deferral arrangement which is often the most significant
component of that incentive. See T. PATTEN, supra note 1, at 504-05; 1 WASHINGTON & ROTHS-
CHILD 107, 163; Colby, Employee Compensation Techniques after the 1976 TRA, 36 N.Y.U. INST.
FED. TAX. 671-72 (1978); Lasser & Rothschild, supra note 1, at 89, 95. See also Kraus, The Deval-
uation of the American Executive, 54 HARV. Bus. REV. 84 (1976).
4. See text accompanying notes 19-27 infra.
5. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.61-16, 43 Fed. Reg. 4638 (1978).
6. Id See note 100 infra.
7. Under provisions of the Revenue Act of 1978, the law in respect to deferred compensa-
tion plans must be administered "in accordance with the principles set forth in regulations, rul-
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Thus, the underlying policy considerations that gave rise to the contro-
versy have yet to be addressed effectively.
This Comment proposes a compromise which is intended to serve
as a vehicle for at least partial implementation of policy objectives in
the area of deferred compensation arrangements, while avoiding the
practical and political difficulties presented by the proposed regulation.
Briefly stated, the proposal advocated by this Comment would impose
an overriding requirement of forfeitability on all nonqualified deferred
compensation plans. Present law distinguishes between funded and
unfunded deferred compensation arrangements, requiring forfeitability
as a condition precedent to tax deferral only in the case of funded
plans.8 This Comment rejects this distinction on theoretical grounds
because by the terms of both the funded and the unfunded nonquali-
fled deferred compensation arrangement, the employee-obligee is the
recipient of a current economic benefit as soon as his rights to deferred
income become nonforfeitable. As a practical matter, a forfeitability
requirement would operate to impose greater restrictions on the availa-
bility of the nonqualified arrangement while at the same time preserv-
ing it as a viable alternative to the qualified plan.
I. THE CURRENT TAX TREATMENT OF NONQUALIFIED DEFERRED
COMPENSATION PLANS
A. Historical Background.
On June 1, 1937, President Roosevelt addressed Congress about
the need for reform of the exemption for pension, profit-sharing and
bonus plans. 9 His message referred to a letter from the Secretary of the
Treasury which observed that the exemption "ha[d] been twisted into a
means of tax avoidance by the creation of pension trusts which include
as beneficiaries only small groups of officers and directors who are in
the high income tax brackets."' 0 The situation described by the Secre-
ings, and judicial decisions relating to deferred compensation which were in effect on February 1,
1978." Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 132, 92 Stat. 2782. It is intended that these
principles are to be determined without regard to the proposed deferred compensation regulation
under section 61 of the Code which was published in the Federal Register, 43 Fed. Reg. 4638
(1978). S. REP. ON H.R. 13511, at 72.
8. See notes 42-48 infra and accompanying text.
9. 81 CONG. REc. 5125 (1937). The prevailing revenue laws exempted from income tax a
trust created by an employer as part of a stock-bonus, profit-sharing or pension plan for the exclu-
sive benefit of some or all of his employees and specified that a distributee was to be taxed upon
amounts actually distributed or made available to him only to the extent that distributions ex-
ceeded his contributions. Rev. Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 219(0, 44 Stat. 9; Rev. Act of 1921, ch. 136,
§ 219(0, 42 Stat. 247.
10. 81 CONG. REC. 5125 (1937).
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tary had resulted from special tax legislation granting favorable treat-
ment to pension plans. Such legislation, enacted as early as 1926,11
permitted employers to take advantage of its provisions primarily for
the benefit of key employees.' 2 The resulting pension arrangements
were in direct contravention of what the Treasury Department re-
garded as the design and purpose of pension plans, namely, "to enable
all or a large percentage of the total number of the employer's clerks
and workmen (as distinguished from persons in positions of authority)
to . . . provide for [themselves] upon their retirement from employ-
ment.""3 It was in response to these abuses that the present tax treat-
ment of pension benefits began to emerge.1
4
B. The TrendA way from Qualiied Plans.
The provisions of the 1939 Internal Revenue Code with respect to
pension, profit-sharing and bonus plans have been significantly ex-
panded under the present Code. 5 Under section 401(a) of the Code,
stringent requirements must be satisfied in order for a trust forming
part of a stock-bonus, pension or profit-sharing plan to qualify for
maximum tax advantages. Although these requirements often discour-
age participation on the part of employers-especially those concerned
with the interests of the high-level executive' 6-qualified deferred com-
pensation plans offer several tax benefits. Chief among these are the
capital gains treatment afforded the employee with respect to distribu-
tions made to him under a qualified trust or annuity plan,' 7 and the
11. Rev. Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 219(f), 44 Stat. 9.
12. The tax statute required only that a plan be "for the exclusive benefit of some or all of the
employees." Id
13. Treas. Reg. 101, art. 165-1 (1939), quoted in 2 WASHINGTON & ROTHSCHILD 661.
14. The first significant changes were introduced by the Revenue Act of 1942, which estab-
lished nondiscrimination requirements for the first time. Rev. Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 162, 56 Stat.
798 (amending I.R.C. of 1939, §§ 22(b)(2), 23(p), 165(a)-(c), now I.R.C. of 1954 Subchapter D).
See Goodfellow, The Tax Consequences of Pension Trusts and Employer Purchased Annuities, 39
CAL. L. REV. 204 (1951); Goodman, Legislative Development of the Federal Tax Treatment of Pen-
sion and Profit-Sharing Plans, 49 TAXES 226 (1971).
15. I.R.C. §§ 401-15, 421-26.
16. For a plan to qualify, it must be offered on a nondiscriminatory basis. I.R.C. § 401(a)(4).
As one commentator has stated: "[In many cases the practical result of the nondiscrimination
requirement necessitates inclusion in the plan of so large a group of employees as to render it
prohibitively expensive tf appreciable benefits to executives are contemplated." Lasser & Roths-
child, supra note 1, at 95 (emphasis added). This result should not be regarded as anomalous,
however, since just such a result was specifically intended by Congress. It is the common worker
who is the intended beneficiary under the qualified plan. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
In the words of political theorist John Rawls, the qualified plan works by design, "to the greatest
benefit of the least advantaged." J. RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 302 (1973).
17. I.R.C. § 402(a)(2) (relating to taxability of beneficiary of employees' trust); id § 403(a)(2)
(relating to taxation of employee annuities).
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availability of an immediate deduction to the employer for contribu-
tions paid into the plan."8
In order for a plan to qualify, contributions or benefits under the
plan may not discriminate in favor of highly compensated executives,
officers or shareholder-employees. 9 Moreover, the plan must be main-'
tained for the exclusive benefit of the employees2 ° and it must satisfy
minimum participation,2 vesting22 and funding standards23 added to
the Code by provisions of the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA) 4 Not surprisingly, perhaps, the Code provisions added
by ERISA are largely responsible for a growing trend away from quali-
fied plans and toward executive nonqualified deferred compensation
arrangements.
The changes introduced by ERISA have made the qualified plan
particularly burdensome from the employer's perspective26 and have
operated as a disincentive to the employer to qualify under the Code by
offering deferred compensation on a nondiscriminatory basis. This is
especially so where the employer was primarily interested in benefiting
his key employees in the first place. Compounding this disincentive is
the fact that if the employer chooses to satisfy the requirements of the
Code by offering a broadly based qualified plan, he will discover that
the limitations on contributions and benefits under the qualified plan27
render it inadequate to serve the typical corporate executive's compen-
sation goals.
ERISA has had a substantial impact on many nonqualified plans
as well. Any employee-benefit plan-whether or not qualified under
the Code-that is established or maintained by an employer engaged in
18. Id § 404(a)(1).
19. I.R.C. § 401(a)(4) provides as follows:
(a) Requirements for qualification.-A trust created or organized in the United
States and forming part of a stock bonus, pension, or profit-sharing plan of an employer
for the exclusive benefit of his employees or their beneficiaries shall constitute a qualified
trust under this section-
(4) If the contributions or the benefits provided under the plan do not discriminate
in favor of employees who are-
(A) officers,
(B) shareholders, or
(C) highly compensated.
20. Id. § 401(a)(2).
21. Id § 410.
22. Id §411.
23. Id § 412.
24. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, §§ 1011, 1012(a),
1013(a), 1014, 1015 and 2004(a), 88 Stat. 829 (adding §§ 410-415 respectively to the Code).
25. Colby, supra note 3, at 682-83.
26. Id
27. I.R.C. § 415.
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or affecting interstate commerce will be subject to the participation,
vesting, funding and fiduciary responsibility provisions generally appli-
cable to qualified plans, unless the plan falls within a specific exemp-
tion from the provisions of ERISA.28 Two exemptions available to
nonqualified plans are especially significant. One type of exempt ar-
rangement is an "excess benefit plan" 9 that is defined as one main-
tained "solely for the purpose of providing benefits for certain
employees in excess of the limitations on contributions and benefits im-
posed by section 415 . . -.3o A second exemption is provided for "a
plan which is unfunded and is maintained by an employer primarily
for the purpose of providing deferred compensation for a select group
of management or highly compensated employees .... 3t
Like qualified plans, those nonqualified plans that are not exempt
from ERISA have become less desirable. On the other hand, those
nonqualified plans which are exempted from the provisions of ERISA
have assumed a new significance and value to those who are eligible to
participate in such arrangements. The result is that ERISA has had the
effect of discouraging participation in qualified plans generally and of
indirectly encouraging the utilization of executive deferred compensa-
tion arrangements. It is the growing utilization of the nonqualified
plan in this context that prompted the drafting of proposed regulation
section 1.61-16.3
C. The Nature of the Nonqualf/ed Plan.
1. The Advantages of the NonqualiFed Plan. Although nonquali-
fled plans lack many of the advantages associated with qualified
plans,33 one significant advantage remains-the deferral of compensa-
tion until income and tax brackets are lower. There are other advan-
tages associated with the nonqualified plan; however, these advantages
ultimately are a function of the executive's ability to avoid current tax
liability for some of his currently earned income. For example, one
commentator notes that an important objective of compensation defer-
28. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, §§ 201, 301, and
401, 88 Stat. 829 (coverage of participation and vesting requirements funding, requirements, and
fiduciary responsibility provisions, respectively).
29. Id §§ 4(b), 201(7), 301(a)(9).
30. Id § 3(36).
31. Id §§ 201(2), 301(a)(3), 401(a)(1).
32. According to IRS officials, Proposed Regulation section 1.61-16 was specifically intended
to check this development by eliminating elective deferrals. Inasmuch as it is almost exclusively
executives who are in a position to elect the form which their compensation will take, the proposed
regulation would have operated primarily to eliminate executive deferred compensation arrange-
ments. Telephone interviews with IRS officials (Sept. 12, 1978).
33. See text accompanying notes 17-18 supra.
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ral for the executive is estate planning.14 He adds, however, that "[t]o a
very important extent, although it may seem flippant to put it this way,
estate planning amounts to planning how to disinherit the Internal
Revenue Service (but in a lawful way)."35 Others similarly observe
that "through such an arrangement, the executive is endeavoring to
have the company provide him with an income after retirement, not on
the relatively modest basis available to employees generally under a
qualified pension program, but on the basis of his highest earnings dur-
ing employment. '36 Thus, although there is an element of estate plan-
ning served by the executive deferred compensation arrangement in
many cases, there is nonetheless an overriding concern that income be
maximized in later years by this method of tax avoidance which "pater-
nalistically guarantee[s] the executive the estate which others must cre-
ate for themselves through their own thrift."37
Other advantages often associated with the nonqualified plan in-
clude its work incentive value;38 the means it provides for assuring the
executive a minimum flow of income and for reducing fluctuations in
his earnings;39 and the manner in which it operates to restore pay dif-
ferentials between higher and lower paid personnel.40 All of these ad-
vantages, however, are a function of tax avoidance and foster goals that
are contrary to sound tax policy. As one commentator has remarked,
"[t]he art of tax avoidance. . . is to approximate a good deal of the
clearly taxable transaction without incurring a good deal of the tax
consequences."'" If the practice cannot be eliminated, it should at least
be sharply limited. However, current law restricts the availability of
types of nonqualified plans with an uneven hand.
2. Distinguishing Fundedfrom Unfunded Plans. When compen-
sation is deferred under a nonqualified funded plan, the employer gen-
erally will deposit funds into an employee trust or purchase an
employee annuity. Both the trust and annuity forms of a funded plan
are covered under the Code4' and the rules under which they operate
are relatively straightforward. The employer's contributions to the
fund are not includible in the employee's gross income until such time
as his rights in the trust or annuity are transferable or no longer subject
34. T. PATrEN, supra note 1, at 483.
35. Id 485.
36. 1 WASHINGTON & ROTHSCHILD 162.
37. Id 161.
38. Id 163; Lasser & Rothschild, supra note 1, at 98.
39. 1 WASHINGTON & ROTHSCHILD 163; Lasser & Rothschild, supra note I, at 97.
40. 1 WASHINGTON & ROTHSCHILD 163. See generally Kraus, supra note 3.
41. Eisenstein, supra note 2, at 400.
42. I.R.C. §§ 402(b), 403(c) (covering trusts and annuities, respectively).
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to a substantial risk of forfeiture.43 The Code provides that the rights
of a person in property are subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture if
the rights to full enjoyment of such property are "conditioned upon the
future performance of substantial services by any individual."'  In the
usual case, then, the employee's rights in the deferred payments are
conditioned upon his remaining in the company's employ for a stated
number of years. Of course, there are other contingencies that may be
tied to the right to receive payments that will equally satisfy the forfei-
ture requirements for purposes of deferral. While the new treasury reg-
ulations provide a number of illustrations that are useful in
determining under what circumstances the possibility of a forfeiture
will be regarded as substantial,45 in the last analysis, whether a risk of
forfeiture is substantial will depend upon the facts and circumstances
surrounding the arrangement.46
In contrast to the funded plan, the unfunded deferred compensa-
tion arrangement47 need not be subject to the possibility of forfeiture
nor to any other substantial limitations on the right to receive pay-
ments. Therefore, the employer and employee need only agree to defer
payment of some part of the employee's current salary or bonus until a
stipulated future date. The unconditional agreement itself suffices to
prevent the current taxation of deferred compensation. No funds are
set aside by the employer for purposes of the arrangement. Rather, the
employer is under a simple contractual obligation to make payments at
a later date.48
Different legal doctrines govern the operation of the funded and
43. Id The forfeitability requirement under these provisions of the Code is cross-referenced
to the forfeitability requirement presc~ibed in I.R.C. § 83(a). See text accompanying notes 51-57
infra.
44. I.R.C. § 83(c)(1). With regard to the requirement that contributions made to the trust be
nontransferable, the Code provides in circular fashion that "[t]he rights of a person in property are
transferable only if the rights in such property of any transferee are not subject to a substantial
risk of forfeiture." Id § 83(c)(2). For the text of section 83, accompanied by the Senate Commit-
tee report, S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 119 (1969), and the Conference Committee report,
H.R. REP. No. 782, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 303 (1969), see 6 J. RABKIN & M. JOHNSON, FEDERAL
INCOME, GIFT AND ESTATE TAXATION 1270-78 (Supp. 1976).
45. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(c)(2) (1978). For example, the regulation provides that when an
employee receives property from an employer subject to a requirement that it be returned if the
total earnings of the employer do not increase, such property is subject to a substantial risk of
forfeiture. On the other hand, requirements that the property be returned to the employer if the
employee is discharged for cause or for committing a crime will not be considered to result in a
substantial risk of forfeiture.
46. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(c)(1) (1978).
47. The unfunded arrangement is governed primarily by Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2 (1971) and by
general tax principles discussed in text accompanying notes 59-62 infra.
48. See notes 67-69 infra and accompanying text. Although there is no immediately apparent
benefit to the employer, there are advantages to the arrangement from his perspective as well.
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unfunded nonqualified deferred compensation arrangement. The un-
funded arrangement raises issues related to constructive receipt, while
the taxation of its funded counterpart represents an application of the
economic benefit rule.
D. Rules Governing the Nonqualified Plan-Economic Benft and
Constructive Recept.
Although as a general rule cash method taxpayers report income
for the year in which they actually receive it in cash or its equivalent,
49
in certain instances they may be held in constructive receipt of income
which is not presently reduced to possession. Where constructive re-
ceipt is found, the income is reportable on a current basis.50 A second
generally accepted principle-the cash equivalent or economic benefit
rule-is that a taxpayer has currently taxable income when he receives
the equivalent of cash in the form of an economic benefit.5 ' Inasmuch
as either of these findings effectively would defeat the purposes served
by a deferred compensation arrangement, the tax planner's first con-
cern is to structure the deferred compensation plan so as to avoid the
application of either rule.
1. The Funded Plan. The funded nonqualified deferred com-
pensation arrangement is governed by sections 402(b) and 403(c) of the
Code. These provisions represent a codification of the economic bene-
fit rule as it relates to nonqualified plans.5 2 The theory of taxation em-
bodied in these sections is that when the amount placed in trust for an
employee, or expended on his behalf to purchase an annuity, is nonfor-
feitable at the time it is contributed, the employee has received an eco-
nomic benefit that is taxable on a current basis. Under present law,
these provisions have been cross-referenced to section 83 of the Code. 3
Section 83 represents both a codification and an expansion of the
Aside from the benefit flowing to the employer from the incentive which such plans serve to instill
in the employee, see authorities cited in note 3 supra, there are indirect pecuniary benefits.
Payment later for services rendered now obviously has the effect of increasing the
employer's current cash flow. ....
. . . Under accepted present value analysis, a dollar in an employer's pocket today
is worth more than a dollar which must be paid at some distant date, especially if the
employer can earn a rate of return on this dollar which is higher than any inflation factor
it must add to the deferred amount.
Greene, Compensating the Executive in Cash: Payment Now or Payment Later, 30 MAJOR TAX
PLAN. 193, 203 (1978). "[The employer's increased cash flow from deferral will be available to
finance not only current operating needs but also expansion." Id 206.
49. I.R.C. § 451.
50. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2 (1971).
51. Id §§ 1.61-2(d) (1978), 1.446-1(a)(3) (1973), 1.446-1(c)(1)(i) (1973).
52. See McDonald 204.
53. I.R.C. §§ 402(b), 403(c).
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common law economic benefit rule as it applies to transfers of property
in connection with the performance of services. In essence, section 83
provides that in any case where, in payment for the performance of
services, property is transferred to any person other than the one per-
forming the services, the taxpayer who performs the services must in-
clude the fair market value of such property in his gross income to the
extent that it exceeds the amount (if any) paid for the property.54 How-
ever, the property is not taxable as income unless it is transferable or
nonforfeitable5 5 In the context of funded nonqualified deferred com-
pensation arrangements covered under the provisions of section 402(b)
and 403(c), the value of the employee's interest in the trust or annuity is
substituted for the fair market value of the property for purposes of
applying section 83, that is, the contributions made by the employer
will not be taxable to the employee until his interest in such deferred
amounts is nonforfeitable 6 Regardless of the context in which it is
applied, the theory is that a taxpayer does not receive a valuable eco-
nomic benefit until his interest is no longer subject to a substantial risk
of forfeiture. 7
2. The Unfunded Plan. Under present law, "[a] mere promise to
pay, not represented by a note or secured in any way, is not regarded as
a receipt of income within the intendment of the cash receipts and dis-
bursements method. ''5 8 Thus, the unfunded deferred compensation ar-
rangement-which is essentially an unsecured promise to pay money in
the future-is not governed by the economic benefit rule. Under cur-
rent law the promisee in such an instance is not in actual receipt of the
money. He may yet be in constructive receipt of deferred compensa-
tion.
The doctrine of constructive receipt is purely a "creature of the
Regulations; they prescribe the conditions which make the doctrine ap-
plicable."5 9 Although the first formal incarnation of the concept dates
as far back as 1919,60 it remains substantially unchanged to this day.
The concept is presently embodied in section 1.451-2 of the Regula-
tions which provides as follows:
(a) General Rule. Income although not actually reduced to a
taxpayer's possession is constructively received by him in the taxable
year during which it is credited to his account, set apart for him, or
54. Id § 83(a).
55. Id
56. I.R.C. §§ 402(b) and 403(c), respectively.
57. See Treas. Reg. § 1.83 (1978).
58. Rev. RuL 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174, 177.
59. Hyland v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d 422, 423 (2d Cir. 1949).
60. Treas. Reg. 45, art. 53, T.D. 2831, 1919.
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otherwise made available so that he may draw upon it at any time, or
so that he could have drawn upon it during the taxable year if notice
of intention to withdraw had been given. However, income is not
constructively received if the taxpayer's control of its receipt is sub-
ject to substantial limitations or restrictions. 6 1
Thus, as a matter of strategy, if the deferred compensation plan or ar-
rangement is to achieve its ends, some substantial limitation must be
placed on the taxpayer's right to receive the deferred income.
There are a number of factors that contribute to a finding of con-
structive receipt.62 If an agreement to defer compensation has the ear-
marks of a sham executed for the purpose of selecting the year in which
to report available income, the taxpayer will be deemed to be in con-
structive receipt of deferred amounts.63 Accordingly, constructive re-
ceipt is likely to be found if an agreement to defer payment is entered
into after the compensation is earned and payable.' 4 On the other
hand, a bona fide agreement to defer the payment of compensation
which is executed prior to the rendition of services will operate to avoid
a finding of constructive receipt.6 5 Because of the prior contract, the
compensation is not available to the taxpayer when earned and remains
unavailable until the date stipulated by the parties.66 Indeed, before
that time, the taxpayer has no legal right to require payment.67 In addi-
tion, a taxpayer may even accomplish deferral of income already
earned through a novation of his employment contract. The only re-
quirement is that the new agreement be executed prior to the date on
61. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2 (1971). It has been suggested that
[tihe doctrine applies only where the taxpayer's control of the item credited is un-
restricted. Thus, a sum is not constructively received if it is only conditionally credited;
or if it is indefinite in amount; or if the payor has no funds with which to pay the credits;
or if it is subject to any other substantial limitation.
Commentary to Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2 (1971), [1978] FED. TAXES (P-H) 1 20,152.
62. A detailed discussion of the doctrine of constructive receipt is beyond the scope of this
Comment. For comprehensive discussions of the topic, see 1 WASHINGTON & ROTHSCHILD 106-
36; Fischer, Executive Compensation Today, 53 TAXES 886 (1975); Jones, Comparative Analysis of
Qualfed and Deferred Compensation Plans, 32 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX. 957 (1974); Knight, In-
come Tax Consequences of Nonqualyied Deferred Compensation, 4 Recapitulation, 21 TAX LAW.
163 (1967); McDonald; Metzer; Rice, The New Tax Policy on Deferred Compensation, 59 MicH. L.
REV. 381 (1961).
63. Joseph Frank, 22 T.C. 945 (1954); Hamilton Nat'l Bank, 29 B.T.A. 63 (1933).
64. Oliver G. Willits, 50 T.C. 602 (1968); Behimer D. Laramy, 25 T.C.M. 809 (1966). See
Knight, supra note 62, at 171-73.
65. Ray S. Robinson, 44 T.C. 20 (1965), acq. 1970-2 C.B. xxi; Rev. Rul. 69-650, 1969-2 C.B.
106; Rev. Rul. 68-86, 1968-1 C.B. 184; Rev. Rul. 60-31 Exs. 1, 2 and 3, 1960-1 C.B. 174. See
Oliver v. United States, 193 F. Supp. 930 (E.D. Ark. 1961); J.D. Amend, 13 T.C. 178 (1949), acq.
1950-1 C.B. 1. See generally Ballard, NonqualfiFed Defered Compensation: Elective Plans and
Other Developments, 25 TAX LAW. 299, 306-08 (1972); Metzer 538-40.
66. See James Gould Cozzens, 19 T.C. 663 (1953); Clifton B. Russel, 5 T.C. 974 (1945).
67. This is true as a matter of simple contract law. See Glenn v. Penn, 250 F.2d 507 (6th Cir.
1958) (dictum).
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which the amounts earned are determinable or become due.6 8
3. Revenue Ruling 60-31. Although the principles described
above have been relied upon by courts for some time,69 it was not until
1960 that they were verified by the IRS in certain important respects.
Prior to 1960, the Service's refusal to issue rulings regarding nonquali-
fled deferral arrangements-despite numerous requests-had created
considerable uncertainty among taxpayers as to what constituted an ac-
ceptable plan. For example, during the early post-World War II period
employers and employees deliberately avoided the representation that
compensation earned by employees had been deferred at their own re-
quest because of fear that this would lead the IRS to find constructive
receipt.7" As an added precaution, the employee's rights under the un-
funded plan often were made subject to the possibility of a forfeiture in
order to satisfy the "substantial limitation" requirement of Regulation
section 1.451-211 in the event that the contractual deferral itself failed
to suffice for that purpose. Others feared that an employer's contrac-
tual promise to pay might be characterized as a cash equivalent taxable
on a current basis.72 As a result, some wary taxpayers took the precau-
tion of making the unsecured promise subject to contingencies so that
valuation of the deferred payments would be impossible.73 On the
other hand, there were those who considered the contractual limitation
on the right to receipt of payments to be sufficient. These taxpayers
relied primarily on a number of cases that supported their position,74
68. Commissioner v. Olmsted Inc. Life Agency, 304 F.2d 16 (8th Cir. 1962), af'g 35 T.C. 429
(1960), nonacq. 1961-2 C.B. 6; Commissioner v. Oates, 207 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1953), a'g 18 T.C.
570 (1952), acq., withdrawing prior nonacq., 1960-1 C.B. 5; Basil F. Basila, 36 T.C. 111 (1961);
Ernest K. Gann, 31 T.C. 211 (1958), acq. 1960-I C.B. 4; Howard Veit, 8 T.C. 809 (1947); Pedro
Sanchez, 6 T.C. 1141, aj'd, 162 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 815 (1947); Kay
Kimbell, 41 B.T.A. 940 (1940). Such a deferral is subject to the condition that the agreement
represent an arm's length business transaction and not a mere subterfuge for the purpose of post-
poning income tax. See Basil F. Basila, 36 T.C. 111 (1961); Howard Veit, 8 T.C. 809 (1947).
69. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Oates, 207 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1953), affg 18 T.C. 570 (1952),
acq., withdrawing prior nonacq., 1960-1 C.B. 5; E.T. Sproull, 16 T.C. 244 (1951), a}?'d, 194 F.2d
541 (6th Cir. 1952); Howard Veit, 8 T.C. 809 (1947).
70. McDonald 206; see I WASHINGTON & ROTHSCHILD 112; Lasser & Rothschild, supra note
1, at 95.
71. See note 61 supra and accompanying text.
72. See text accompanying note 51 supra.
73. McDonald 208-09.
74. In two related cases, Howard Veit, 8 T.C. 809 (1947), acq. 1947-2 C.B. 4, and Howard
Veit, 8 T.C.M. 919 (1949), the court made it evident that a cash basis taxpayer can effectively defer
income if he enters into an arms-length agreement to defer before income is due and payable.
Similarly, in James F. Oates, 18 T.C. 570 (1952), aj'd, 207 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1953), acq., withdraw-
ing aprior nonacq., 1960-1 C.B. 5, the court held that where insurance agents upon retirement
may elect to amend their contracts and receive renewal premiums in monthly installments over a
period not to exceed 180 months or to abide by an existing contract and receive commissions in
cash as they are paid to the company, election to defer shall not put an agent in constructive
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notwithstanding indications that the IRS was not in agreement.75 In
1960, however, the Service allayed all fears when it gave its approval,
in Revenue Ruling 60-31,76 to a very liberal interpretation of the doc-
trine of constructive receipt while at the same time announcing the in-
applicability of the economic benefit rule to unfunded arrangements.
The unfunded plan could be elective and nonforfeitable, and there
were to be few, if any, restraints on its availability.
Revenue Ruling 60-31 has become the cornerstone of the modem
nonqualified deferred compensation plan.77 The ruling established the
proposition that a contract postponing the right to receive payment for
services, which was entered into before anlounts were due and payable,
would act to take the arrangement outside the scope of the constructive
receipt doctrine.7" Beyond this, two express provisions of the ruling are
especially significant for present purposes: first, "[a] mere promise to
pay, not represented by notes or secured in any way, is not regarded as
a receipt of income within the intendment of the cash receipts and dis-
bursements method;' 79 and second, "the statute [§ 451 and the regula-
tions thereunder] cannot be administered by speculating whether the
payor would have been willing to agree to an earlier payment."80
Thus, the ruling established a point already mentioned, namely, that
unfunded plans are not within the operation of the economic benefit
rule. It further established, however, that the Service would not scruti-
nize arrangements to determine at whose behest they were created.8'
While the Service has currently assumed a more restrictive position for
ruling purposes, 2 this substantially remains the law as currently ad-
receipt. Rather, agents are taxable only on the amounts which they actually receive in each of the
taxable years, and are not taxable on commissions credited to their accounts which they did not
receive and are not entitled to receive under their contract until some future year.
75. For example, the IRS originally published a nonacquiesce in respect to Oates. 1952-2
C.B. 5. It was not until 1960 that the IRS replaced its prior nonacquiescence in the decision with
an acquiescence. 1960-1 C.B. 5.
76. 1960-1 C.B. 174, modfedby Rev. Rul. 64-279, 1964-2 C.B. 121 (announcing that advance
rulings would be issued in respect to nonqualified deferred compensation plans); Rev. Rul. 70-435,
1970-2 C.B. 100 (example 5 of Rev. Rul. 60-31 modifled in light of Ray S. Robinson, 44 T.C. 20
(1965), acq. 1970-2 C.B. xxi).
77. See authorities cited in note 62 supra.
78. 1960-1 C.B. 174 (examples 1, 2 & 3).
79. Id 177.
80. Id 178.
81. Id
82. In 1971, the IRS issued Rev. Proc. 71-19 in which it was stated that for rulingpurfposes,
for any election subsequent to the beginning of the service period, the plan must set forth "sub-
stantial forfeiture provisions that must remain in effect throughout the entire period of the defer-
ral." 1971-1 C.B. 698. It has been observed further that the Service (as of January 1977) required
that the following conditions be satisfied before it would rule on the tax consequences of an
elective deferred compensation arrangement:
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ministered. Accordingly, one commentator has observed of nonquali-
fled plans that "[t]he possibilities are endless, and little or no
requirements are imposed by the Code or the Internal Revenue Serv-
ice, if the total compensation is not unreasonable, if the employee does
not have a right to demand earlier payment, and if the amount is not
funded."83
II. PROPOSED REGULATION SECTION 1.61-16
A. Background-A Response to Policy Objectives.
The first major initiative for a departure from the law as stated by
Revenue Ruling 60-31 came from Congress. The House version of the
1969 Tax Reform Act84 would have continued to tax deferred compen-
sation in accordance with Revenue Ruling 60-31. However, to the ex-
tent that the deferred compensation exceeded $10,000 a year, the House
proposed to tax the income at the rates that would have been applicable
had the income been received when earned." In the words of the
House Committee report:
It is anomalous that the tax treatment of deferred compensation
should depend on whether the amount to be deferred is placed in a
trust or whether it is merely accumulated as a reserve on the books of
the employer corporation. An employee who receives additional
compensation in the form of a promise to pay him that compensation
in the future made by a large, financially sound corporation, is prob-
ably as likely to receive the compensation as an employee whose de-
ferred compensation is placed in trust. Your committee believes that
the possibility of shifting income to taxable years after retirement
when the marginal tax bracket is expected to be lower should not be
(1) The initial election of deferral of payment must irrevocably designate the time and
manner of payment.
(2) The employer must not be obligated to hold an annuity contract, life insurance
policy or other assets as the funding vehicle to provide the benefits, although it may
in its own discretion choose to do so.
(3) Although an employee can elect the form of hypothetical or actual investment
which is to be used as a technique to measure any appreciation on the original
amount of his deferred payments, the employer must retain the right to veto in its
absolute discretion any investment selected by the employee or to make no invest-
ment at all.
(4) Benefit payments can commence only upon death, termination of employment, re-
tirement or an emergency.
(5) The payment in the case of an emergency can only take place in instances of hard-
ship arising from causes beyond the employee's control and the payment, if made in
such a case, must be limited to the amount necessary to meet such hardship.
Field, Deferred Compensation, 35 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX. 1511, 1522 (1977); see Fischer, supra
note 62, at 891.
83. Jones, supra note 62, at 979-80.
84. H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 90 (1969), reprinted in [1969] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 1738.
85. 1969 S. REP. 307, reprinted in [1969] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2027, 2346.
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available to employees who are in a position to bargain for deferred
compensation arrangements and to rely on the unsecured obligation
of their employers, when such benefits are not available to other em-
ployees.8 6
The House provision was deleted by the Senate, however, at the request
of the Treasury Department, which indicated that the matter required
86. H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 90 (1969), reprinted in [19691 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 1738.
As the Senate report explains, the concern addressed by the House was that key employees
enjoy the advantage, not shared by other employees, of being able to negotiate with their employ-
ers to avoid "the graduation in the present tax structure intended to be generally applicable."
1969 S. REP. 307, reprintedin [1969] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2027, 2346. The equalization
of income through progressive taxation and social expenditures is an accepted and operative prin-
ciple of taxation. See Hearings, supra note 2, at 809 (statement of Murray L. Weidenbaum, Direc-
tor, Center for the Study of American Business, Washington Univ.), reprinted in Daily Tax Rep.
(BNA) 2 (Special Supp. Aug. 29, 1978); R. FREEMAN, supra note 2, at 6. However, there remains
the question of how progressive a system is desirable. This question is often answered in the
policy choices made by Congress that presumably reflect the dominant values of our society.
However, American notions of individualism which have served a normative function in the past
have been largely displaced in recent decades. Indeed, in many respects an egalitarian ethic has
emerged as an operative force in American society that may require the rethinking of basic poli-
cies.
Perhaps the most noted statesman of this new ethic is John Rawls. Rawls states that in the
just society, "[elach person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal
basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all." J. RAWLS, supra note 16, at 302.
Indeed, "[siocial and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are ... to the greatest
benefit of the least advantaged." Id "To the juridical equality of the liberal principle is added a
right to an equal share in possession." Scheltens, The Social Contract and the Principle ofLalv, 17
INT'L PHILOSOPHICAL Q. 317, 328 (1977).
It should be noted that the business community is itself becoming aware of the shifting Amer-
ican perspective. George Cabot Lodge has urged the business world to meet the challenge of
society's current revaluation with imagination. Lodge, Business and the Changing Sociey, 52
HARV. Bus. REV. 59 (1974). He describes that revaluation in terms not unlike those suggested by
Rawls:
Today there is a new right which clearly supersedes property rights in political and
social importance. It is the right to survive-to enjoy income, health, and other rights
associated with membership in the American community or in some component of that
community, including a corporation ....
The right derives not from any individualistic action or need; it does not emanate
from contract. It is a communitarian right the public opinion holds to be consistent with
a good community. It is a revolutionary departure from the old Lockean conception
under which only the fit survive.
Id 65. See generally Lodge, supra, for a discussion of the problems growing out of these changes
and the varied corporate responses.
Of course, many are unprepared to follow Rawls to his ultimate conclusions. Indeed, there
are those who view any such insistence on equality of result as well as equality of opportunity as
economically-if not ideologically-disastrous. See generall, Kraus, supra note 3. Nonetheless,
certain current policies reflect at least a moderate adaptation of the Rawlsian thesis. See Lodge,
supra.
Against this background, it is suggested that the executive deferred compensation arrange-
ment is essentially a tax avoidance device fundamentally out of step with social policies and the
proper operation of a progressive tax system. In short, the overall reduction of income differen-
tials is a progressive trend which the typical executive compensation package tends to defeat.
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further study and that an alternative solution might be preferable.8 7
In 1972, while it continued to study the issues presented by non-
qualified income deferral plans, the Treasury Department proposed
regulations dealing with qualified plans.88 The Department found the
elective nature of many such plans disturbing. The proposal would
have amended Code sections 401 (regulating qualified trusts), 403 (reg-
ulating qualified annuity plans) and 405 (regulating qualified bond-
purchase plans) in order to clarify the tax treatment of contributions to
such plans.8 9 Under the proposed regulations, employer contributions
to a qualified deferred compensation arrangement were to be regarded
as employee contributions whenever such contributions were made at
the employee's individual option in return for a reduction in his compen-
sation, or in lieu of an increase. As a result, contributions to an elective
qualified plan were to be taxable to the employee on a current basis.9"
In order to allow time for congressional study of the 1972 propo-
sal, section 2006 of ERISA9' provided for a temporary freeze of the
status quo. The Revenue Act of 1978 finally disposed of the issue of
the proper treatment of elective qualified salary reduction plans by re-
jecting the proposed changes outright.92 Salary reduction plans will
87. 1969 S. REP. 307, reprinted in [1969] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2027, 2346. The
Finance Committee reported that "[t]he Treasury Department has undertaken a comprehensive
study of both qualified and nonqualified employee benefit plans, and it intends, as part of this
study, to develop recommendations dealing with the tax consequences of all deferred compensa-
tion arrangements." Id
88. Proposed Treas. Reg. §§ 1.402(a)-l(a)(1)(i), 1.403(a)-(1)(a), 1.405-3(a)(1), 37 Fed. Reg.
25,938-39 (1972).
89. Id
90. See [1978] 1 FED. TAX GUIDE REP. (CCH) 8473 (New Developments). Although tech-
nically the proposed regulations were confined to qualified salary reduction plans, their implica-
tions reached all plans under which the employee was given a choice of benefits, some of which
are currently taxable. See Metzer (case study of the salary reduction plan examining its contem-
plated treatment under the proposed regulation).
91. Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 2006, 88
Stat. 822). Under ERISA, the tax treatment of contributions to salary reduction plans in existence
on June 27, 1974, was governed by the law as it was applied prior to January 1, 1972. This
treatment was to continue at least through December 31, 1976, or until regulations were issued in
final form. However, in the case of plans begun after June 27, 1974, contributions to a qualified
salary reduction plan were to be treated as employee contributions. The Tax Reform Act of 1976
extended the temporary freeze on the status quo until January 1, 1978, in order to allow additional
time for congressional study of the area. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1506, 90
Stat. 1739 (amending ERISA § 2006).
92. The proposed regulations were actually withdrawn in July 1978. However, the with-
drawal of the proposed regulations was not intended to represent a change in the Internal Reve-
nue Service's position. S. REP. ON H.R. 13511, at 77. Section 135 of the Revenue Act of 1978
provides that a participant in a qualified cash or deferred arrangement will not have to include in
income any employer contribution to the plan merely because he could have elected to receive
such amount in cash instead. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 135, 92 Stat. 2785.
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again be treated as tax-qualified provided they satisfy the law with re-
spect to such plans as it was administered prior to the date of the an-
nounced proposals for change.93
The evolution of proposed regulation section 1.61-1694 took a dif-
ferent route. In 1972, the Internal Revenue Service issued the first of a
series of favorable private letter rulings approving Revenue Ruling 60-
31's treatment of unfunded deferred compensation arrangements be-
tween governmental employees and state and local government em-
ployers.9" This treatment was viewed as particularly problematic
because governmental employers are tax-exempt. Where the employer
is a taxable entity, his payment of deferred income to the employee is
not immediately deductible. The requirement that the employer post-
pone his deduction until actual distribution of deferred income thus
creates a natural constraint on the use of the unfunded arrangement.
The tax-exempt employer is under no similar constraint. Perhaps be-
cause of this absence of tax-related employer constraints, there were
many plans in operation which permitted governmental employees to
elect to defer a portion of salary that would otherwise be payable. Dis-
turbed by the elective nature of such plans, the IRS stopped issuing
private rulings with respect to them and announced the suspension of
rulings pending review of the area.96 The problem was perceived to
sound in constructive receipt: "The IRS is concerned that, in substance,
the employee receives the compensation and deposits it with the em-
ployer to be held for the employee's benefit." 97 This concern with elec-
93. The Senate report explains the reasons for the change:
Since the enactment of ERISA the freeze of the status quo treatment of cash or
deferred profit-sharing plans has prevented employers from setting up new plans of this
type for their employees. Originally, it was thought that a relatively short period of time
would be needed for Congressional study and that a permanent solution would be in
place by January 1, 1977. The committee believes that the uncertainty caused by the
present state of the law has created the need for a permanent solution which permits
employers to establish new cash or deferred arrangements. Also, the committee believes
that present law discriminates against employers who had not established such arrange-
ments by June 27, 1974.
S. REP. ON H.R. 13511, at 77.
94. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.61-16, 43 Fed. Reg. 4638 (1978).
95. H. R. REP. ON H.R. 13511, at 50.
96. Int. Rev. News Rel. 1881 (Sept. 7, 1977), reprinted in 1977-2 U.S. TAX WEEK 1131.
97. Id The Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 131, 92 Stat. 2779, adds a new section
457 to the Code to provide certainty with respect to unfunded deferred compensation plans main-
tained by state and local governments. Elective deferral of income is permitted for the lesser of
$7500 or 33-1/3% of the participant's includible compensation for the taxable year. An eligible
state deferred compensation plan cannot make benefits available to participants earlier than their
separation from service with the sponsoring entity or the occurrence of an unforeseeable emer-
gency. The new provision stresses that all property or rights to property purchased with the
amounts deferred, and any income earned on the property purchased with amounts deferred, must
remain assets of the plan sponsor subject to the claims ofits general creditors. While plan partici-
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tive government employee plans was reflected on a larger scale with
respect to nonqualified plans generally in the full regulation which was
proposed in February of 1978-Proposed Regulation section 1.61-16.98
B. Proposed Regulation Section 1.61-16.
Proposed Regulation section 1.61-16 represents an outgrowth of
the developments outlined above. It provides that if a taxpayer
(whether or not an employee) individually chooses to defer the receipt
of some portion of his current compensation until a later year, the de-
ferred amount will nevertheless be treated as received by the taxpayer
in the year when it was earned. The provisions of the regulation would
apply to nonqualified plans only.99 Significantly, for the purposes of
the regulation, it would be immaterial that the taxpayer's rights in the
amounts deferred became forfeitable by reason of his exercise of the
option to defer payment.100
pants may select among optional methods provided under the plan for investing deferred compen-
sation, they cannot have any secured interest in the assets purchased with their deferred
compensation.
98. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.61-16, 43 Fed. Reg. 4638, 4639 (1978).
99. Although it is not apparent by the terms of the proposed regulation, the contemplated
changes were only to extend to unfunded nonqualified arrangements. This is made clear by the
language of the Revenue Act of 1978, which rejects the proposed change: "The taxable year of
inclusion in gross income of any amount covered by a private deferred compensation plan shall be
determined in accordance with the principles set forth in regulations, rulings, and judicial deci-
sions relating to deferred compensation which were in effect on February 1, 1978." Revenue Act
of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 132(a), 92 Stat. 2782. The Act provides that the term "private
deferred compensation plan" does not include "an annuity plan or contract described in section
403" of the Code (a funded arrangement), id. § 132(b)(2); "that portion of any plan which consists
of a transfer of property described in section 83" of the Code (again pertaining to funded arrange-
ments), id.; nor "that portion of any plan which consists of a trust to which section 402(b) of such
Code applies" (pertaining to trust funds), id. This understanding of the deferred compensation
plan as limited to unfunded arrangements undoubtedly coincides with the intention of Proposed
Treasury Regulation section 1.61-16. An examination of the rulings which are regarded as impli-
cated by the proposed changes corroborates this assertion. See notes 101-04 infra and accompany-
ing text.
100. The text of the proposal is as follows:
(a) In general. Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (b) of this section, if
under a plan or arrangement (other than a plan or arrangement described in sections
401(a), 403(a) or (b) or 405(a)) payment of an amount of a taxpayer's basic or regular
compensation fixed by contract, statute, or otherwise (or supplements to such compensa-
tion, such as bonuses, or increases in such compensation) is, at the taxpayer's individual
option, deferred to a taxable year later than that in which such amount would have been
payable but for his exercise of such option, the amount shall be treated as received by the
taxpayer in such earlier taxable year. For purposes of this paragraph, it is immaterial
that the taxpayer's rights in the amount payment of which is so deferred become forfeita-
ble by reason of his exercise of the option to defer payment.
(b) Exception. Paragraph (a) of this section shall not apply to an amount pay-
ment of which is deferred as described in paragraph (a) under a plan or arrangement in
existence on February 3, 1978 if such amount would have been payable, but for the
taxpayer's exercise of the option, at any time prior to (date 30 days following publication
of this section as a Treasury decision). For the purposes of this paragraph, a plan or
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Because the proposed regulation represented a complete departure
from existing law in the area of nonqualified deferred compensation
plans, the effect of the regulation on current plans would have been
monumental. Indeed, according to the Treasury,' 0 ' if the regulation
were to be published as a Treasury decision, a whole series of revenue
rulings would no longer be applied1"2 and present Service acquies-
cences in certain key cases 0 3 would have to be reconsidered." De-
spite the Service's apparent longstanding acquiescence in the present
state of the law, however, the concerns which surfaced in this regula-
tion are not of recent origin. The Service has never been entirely com-
fortable with the liberal treatment afforded nonqualified plans by
Revenue Ruling 60-31, as is evidenced by its ever-changing stance on
rulings during the 1960s.1°5
The proposed regulation addressed one central problem created by
current law-that key employees enjoy the advantage, not shared by
other employees, of being able to negotiate with their employers to
avoid "the graduation in the present tax structure intended to be gener-
ally applicable."'0 6 In the view of both the IRS and the Treasury De-
partment, the problem has become particularly acute since the passage
of ERISA, which resulted in an increased use of nonqualified plans.'
0 7
arrangement in existence on February 3, 1978 which is significantly amended after such
date will be treated as a new plan as of the date of such amendment. Examples of
significant amendments would be extension of coverage to an additional class of taxpay-
ers or an increase in the maximum percentage of compensation subject to the taxpayer's
option.
Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.61-16, 43 Fed. Reg. 4638, 4639 (1978).
101. Treas. Dep't. Explanation of Proposed Regulation § 1.61-16, 43 Fed. Reg. 4638 (1978).
102. The rulings cited by the Treasury Department were: Rev. Rul. 71-419, 1971-2 C.B. 220
(directors' fees deferred despite the fact that the corporation maintained a separate memorandum
account of amounts deferred by each director, and notwithstanding the fact that the corporation
credited the account with interest at a specified rate); Rev. Rul. 69-650, 1969-2 C.B. 106 (income is
not constructively received where an irrevocable election is made to defer a portion of salary and
where the amounts deferred were satisfied from general corporate funds subject to creditors'
claims); Rev. Rul. 68-86, 1968-1 C.B. 184 (deferral permitted if employee elected bonus in em-
ployer stock subject to restrictions significantly affecting its value); Rev. Rul. 67-449, 1967-2 C.B.
173 (tax deferral achieved through "substantial forfeiture" provisions). 43 Fed. Reg. 4638 (1978).
103. The cases which would have required reconsideration were: Ray S. Robinson, 44 T.C. 20
(1965), acq. 1970-2 C.B. xxi (prizefighter held taxable in 1957 only for those proceeds from fight
actually received in 1957 under contract with promoter providing for payment of balance over
three-year period); James F. Oates, 18 T.C. 570 (1952), aft'd, 207 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1953), acq.,
withdrawing prior nonacq. 43 Fed. Reg. 4638 (1978). See note 74 supra.
104. The Treasury Department stated that it would also be necessary to examine the facts and
circumstances of a number of other rulings and cases reflecting similar patterns to determine at
whose election deferral of payment of compensation was arranged, e.g., Rev. Rul. 72-35, 1972-1
C.B. 127; Rev. Rul. 68-99, 1968-1 C.B. 193; Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174 (examples I and 3).
105. For an exhaustive list of Service maneuverings, see Metzer 538-39 n.52.
106. 1969 S. REP. 307, refprinted in [1969] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2027, 2346.
107. See text accompanying notes 20-28.
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The proposed regulation was regarded as an answer to that growing
concern. Unfortunately, there were problems inherent in the propo-
sal-both theoretical and practical-that may have contributed to
Congress' decision to reject it.'0 8
C. The Problems with the Proposed Change.
The proposed regulation presented several practical difficulties.
Most notably, the promulgation of the regulation would have given rise
to a great many problems in administration. As the IRS observed, "the
statute [section 451 and regulations thereunder] cannot be administered
by speculating whether the payor would have been willing to agree to
an earlier payment."'' 9 The case-by-case determination of whether
deferral was at the taxpayer's option or was mandated by the employer
would have created an obvious problem of proof with which neither
the Service nor the courts may have been able to contend. 10 Further-
more, problems of proof undoubtedly would have been complicated by
the automatic tactical adjustments that the business community would
have made. Differences in interpretation as to what constitutes an em-
ployer-mandated plan as opposed to an elective plan would have com-
pounded problems of abuse and further obscured application of the
regulation.
Finally, the proposed regulation presented a practical problem of a
different kind that perhaps was most responsible for its defeat-the
changes that it would have introduced simply were viewed as too dras-
tic."' The regulation effectively would have eliminated the vast major-
ity of executive deferred compensation arrangements currently in use.
Wherever deferral was made at the employee's option, no forfeiture
provision-however severe-would have operated in any way to in-
hibit application of the regulation. Without passing on the merits of
such a result, it suffices to say that it probably exceeded any change that
the business community and the current Congress were willing to toler-
108. See text accompanying note 7.
109. Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174, 178.
110. None of the rulings or cases cited by the Treasury Department for reconsideration in-
volved a determination that the deferral arrangement was elective. The elective or nonelective
nature of the plan was not in issue in any of these cases nor was it thought to be at all relevant.
See notes 101-04 supra and accompanying text.
I1l. In rejecting the proposed regulation, the House Ways and Means Committee stated:
The committee believes that the doctrine of constructive receipt should not be ap-
plied to employees as would be provided in the proposed regulations concerning non-
qualified deferred compensation plans issued by the Internal Revenue Service on
February 3, 1978. The committee also believes that the uncertainty surrounding the sta-
tus of private nonqualified deferred compensation plans caused by the proposed regula-
tions is not desirable and should not be permitted to continue.
H.R. REP. ON H.R. 13511, at 60.
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D. The Theoretical Basis of the Proposed Regulation.
Because Proposed Regulation section 1.61-16 has been rendered
moot by the Revenue Act of 1978112 an examination of its theoretical
underpinnings may, at first glance, appear to be merely academic.
However, the inquiry goes to a larger concern: the relationship between
theory and result. Essentially, only two theories operate with respect to
nonqualified plans-the doctrine of constructive receipt and the eco-
nomic benefit rule. Some have argued that a third theory-the doctrine
of assignment of income-also is applicable. In any event, as a concep-
tual matter, the regulation of nonqualified deferred compensation ar-
rangements necessarily rests upon one of these doctrinal bases. The
task, therefore, is to distinguish both the theories and the results that
can be effected by resort to each of them.
The Treasury Department and the IRS arrived at divergent view-
points regarding the legal basis upon which to justify Proposed Regula-
tion section 1.61-16. Each position will be examined in turn, with
particular emphasis on the view adopted by the IRS.
The Treasury Department position turns on an application of no-
tions of constructive receipt."1 3 Although it would represent a depar-
ture from prior decisional law, it is arguably correct to apply the
constructive receipt doctrine to self-imposed limitations on the right to
receive income. To say that a taxpayer who engineers the deferral of
some part of his income by contractual arrangement lacks substantial
control of its receipt is to ignore practical realities in favor of form.
Thus, the Treasury Department's decision to treat amounts so deferred
as currently taxable income may represent a simple refusal to continue
to favor form over substance.
While a contract providing for deferred compensation may impose
a legitimate restraint on a taxpayer's right to receive income, where the
agreement is made at the taxpayer's request, he may fairly be deemed
to have turned his back on income otherwise available. Logically, this
is so even if the amounts deferred are made subject to the possibility of
a forfeiture, since forfeiture provisions may be avoided entirely if a tax-
payer elects to receive all income on a current basis. It is an accepted
principle that a taxpayer who has received income-whether actually
or constructively-incurs a current tax liability, irrespective of any sub-
112. See note 7 supra.
113. This is the position that was assumed by the Treasury Department, according to one
department official informally interviewed (Sept. 12, 1978).
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sequent disposition of the income. 1 4 Thus, the proposed regulation
correctly disregarded the presence of forfeiture provisions by treating
them as irrelevant to the question of constructive receipt as that doc-
trine was interpreted for purposes of the regulation." 5 As a practical
matter, however, the failure of the regulation to distinguish between
forfeitable and nonforfeitable plans probably added to the perceived
severity of the proposed change.
The theory adopted by the IRS with respect to the proposed regu-
lation is not as easily justified as that of the Treasury Department. The
Service grounds the recent proposal in the doctrine of assignment of
income.' 16 Apparently, the IRS reasons that a voluntary deferral of
income through an unfunded arrangement is an assignment of income
*to the employer-promisor and thus taxable to the person who earns it
on a current basis. 17
The underlying principle of the assignment of income doctrine is
that income shall be taxable to the person who earns it and that the tax
cannot be avoided by anticipatory assignments of the income to
others. II It is clear, therefore, that the IRS' application of the assign-
114. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-1(a) (1971).
115. See note 100 supra.
116. This is the position that was adopted by the IRS as was indicated by one agency official
during the course of an informal interview (Sept. 12, 1978).
117. In principle there is no reason why the same analysis would not be equally applicable to
funded arrangements. A voluntary deferral of income in that context might be regarded as an
assignment of income to the trust, escrow agent or insurance company that is providing the fund-
ing mechanism. However, the reach of the proposed changes was limited to unfunded arrange-
ments. See note 99 supra.
118. The first formal enunciation of the doctrine of assignment of income was in 1930 when
the Supreme Court in Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930), held a taxpayer liable for income tax
upon the whole of his salary and attorney's fees even though he had made a valid prior assign-
ment of one-half to his wife. In the words of Justice Holmes, speaking for the Court, "There is no
doubt that the statute could tax salaries to those who earned them and provide that the tax could
not be escaped by anticipatory arrangements and contracts however skillfully devised to prevent
the salary when paid from vesting even for a second in the man who earned it." Id at 114-15. In
a series of cases that followed Lucas, the same principle was applied. Eg., Harrison v. Schaffner,
312 U.S. 579 (1941); Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122 (1940); Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112
(1940); Burnet v. Leininger, 285 U.S. 136 (1932); Armantrout v. Commissioner, 570 F.2d 210 (7th
Cir. 1978) (per curiam), aff'g 67 T.C. 996 (1977); Wilson v. United States, 530 F.2d 772 (8th Cir.
1976); Duran v. Commissioner, 123 F.2d 324 (10th Cir. 1941); Commissioner v. Bonwit, 87 F.2d
764 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 694 (1937); Ronan State Bank v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 27
(1974). See also Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733 (1949); Lusthaus v. Commissioner,
327 U.S. 293 (1946); Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280 (1946).
An analysis of the doctrine of assignment of income reveals that it is in fact little more than
an aspect of the economic benefit rule requiring a taxpayer to pay taxes on all income received in
cash or its equivalent. When one earns the right to receipt of income and directs it to be paid to a
third party in satisfaction of a debt or as a gift, one has received the equivalent of direct payment
and is taxable on that basis. As explained in Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 116-17 (1940):
[U]nderlying the reasoning in these cases is the thought that income is "realized" by
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ment of income doctrine to deferred compensation arrangements re-
flects an elementary misunderstanding of the concept. While
assignment of income involves a voluntary disposition of income in
favor of a third party," 9 the question posed in the present context is the
proper tax treatment of income deferral.120 There is no doubt that the
employee will be taxable on the deferred income; rather, the question
concerns the proper timing of the taxation.
Although the concept of assignment of income is relatively
straightforward, a number of fairly recent cases have done much to
obscure it.'2 ' One easily misunderstood case, United States v. Bayse,t22
the assignor because he, who owns or controls the source of income, also controls the
disposition of that which he could have received himself and diverts the payment from
himself to others as the means of procuring the satisfaction of his wants.
119. See Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122 (1940); Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940);
Duran v. Commissioner, 123 F.2d 324 (10th Cir. 1941).
120. The distinction between a disposition or assignment of income and a mere deferral is
drawn in clear terms in James F. Oates, 18 T.C. 570 (1952). Referring to Lucas, Eubank and
Horst, the court stated:
Those are cases where the income had been assigned to another and the taxpayer was
contending that the assignment relieved him of taxation on the income and that the
income was taxable to the one to whom it had been assigned. We have no such question
here. Petitioners are making no contention that the commissions credited to their ac-
count. . . in the taxable years will not be taxable to them if and when they receive them.
Their contention is that under their amended contracts.., they were not entitled to
receive any more than they did in fact receive and that being on the cash basis they can
only be taxed on these amounts and that the remainder will be taxed to them if and when
received by them.
Id. at 585.
This passage was later quoted by the court in Ernest K. Gann, 31 T.C. 211,219 (1958), acq. 1960-1
C.B. 4, in order to make the identical point when again the argument of assignment of income was
raised in the context of a deferral.
121. In Llewellyn v. Commissioner, 295 F.2d 649 (7th Cir. 1961), a pathologist modified his
employment contract with two hospitals in order to have a portion of his compensation applied to
the purchase of annuities for him. His assumption was that the arrangement would qualify under
section 403 of the Code because the hospital-employer was tax-exempt (under the provisions of
I.R.C. § 501). However, the court determined this issue against him, declining to characterize the
payments made to the insurance company as "employer contributions" within the meaning of
section 403(a) of the Code, and further noting that "the amounts deducted from Dr. Llewellyn's
percentage of the gross receipts and paid out, at his direction, to Phoenix Mutual [from whom the
annuities were purchased], were not employers' contributions, but were income constructively re-
ceived by Dr. Llewellyn and as such constitutes taxable income to him." Id. at 651. However,
although the amounts applied to the purchase of annuities were properly taxable on a current
basis as a matter of the doctrine of cash equivalence or economic benefit, or upon the basis of the
somewhat overlapping concept of constructive receipt, the court regrettably placed the holding of
the case on a different footing, stating that "[i]n effect, Dr. Llewellyn [had] made anticipatory
assignments of part of his income to Phoenix Mutual." Id The difficulty with the court's position
is that the case did not turn upon a consideration of to whom the income should be taxable. See
note 95 supra and accompanying text.
In Hicks v. United States, 314 F.2d 180 (4th Cir. 1963), the Fourth Circuit opted for a similar
analysis. There the taxpayer had the right to take an annual bonus either entirely in cash, or
partly in cash and partly in the form of an interest in a qualified trust. Since the trust was subject
only to a five percent penalty for early withdrawal it was essentially nonforfeitable. Determining
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has particularly attracted the attention of the IRS. In fact, the case is
central to its understanding of the proposed change.2 3 Bayse will be
examined here for two purposes: to arrive at an understanding of both
the principle of the case and the Service's application of it; and to fur-
ther distinguish both the theories operative in the area of deferred com-
pensation and the results that can be effected by them.
Bayse involved a complicated fact situation. Assignment of in-
come clearly was the basis for the decision, but it is unclear at what
level of the decision it came into play. The case involved a medical
partnership that performed services for a prepaid health plan. At the
request ofthepartnershp, the health plan was required by the terms of
the service contract to make annual payments into a retirement trust
for the benefit of the partners and nonpartner employees of the partner-
ship. No interest in the account was deemed to vest in a particular
beneficiary prior to his retirement, and a physician's preretirement sev-
erance from the partnership would occasion the forfeiture of his inter-
est. Amounts thus forfeited were redistributed to the remaining
participants. 24 Under no circumstances, however, could the health
plan recoup payments once made, and payments made to the trust were
not forfeitable by the partnership as such.' 25 The Court held that the
retirement fund payments were compensation for services rendered
that an election to participate was, in effect, an "employee contribution," the court, as had the
Seventh Circuit in Lleweilyn, held the taxpayer taxable on a current basis for amounts paid over to
the plan. Again, the court revealed an elementary confusion as to the properly applicable theory,
reviewing, in the course of its opinion, cases involving each of the three common law doctrines of
constructive receipt, assignment of income and economic benefit. Ultimately, however, the opin-
ion rested on a finding of constructive receipt:
Hicks' written instruction diverting the payment from himself to the trustee was a volun-
tary act in exercise of his power to dispose of the income represented by that pay-
ment. . . . Therefore, the payment here involved became available without condition or
limitation in 1958, Hicks constructively received it at that time and it was properly sub-
ject to the payment of income tax for that year.
Id at 185.
In the same year in which the Hicks case was decided, the IRS published Rev. Rul. 63-180,
1963-2 C.B. 189, announcing that Hicks would be confined to its facts. The general rule remained
that where an employer makes a contribution in behalf of an employee to a qualified trust, the
contribution will be tax-deferred until such time as it is distributed or made available to the em-
ployee. For an analysis of the Hicks case and the aftermath, see Rothschild & Ness, IRS Confines
Hicks Case and Sanctions Deferred Compensation Choices, 19 J. TAX. 216 (1963).
122. 410 U.S. 441 (1973).
123. The importance of the Bayse decision to the IRS' conception of assignment of income in
the context of voluntary deferrals was related to this author during the course of an informal
interview with an IRS official (Sept. 12, 1978).
124. Indeed, under the terms of the agreement, the plan was to continue irrespective either of
changes in the partnership's personnel or of alterations in its organizational structure. The plan
would survive any reorganization of the partnership so long as at least 50% of the plan's partici-
pants remained associated with the reorganized entity. 410 U.S. at 445.
125. Id
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under the medical-service agreement and should have been reported as
income to the partnership. Furthermore, the individual partners
should have included their shares of that income in their individual
returns, since income fully earned by the partnership is taxable to the
partners, regardless of any conditions placed upon their actual receipt
of individual shares of that income.1
2 6
The Supreme Court in Bayse prefaced its opinion by noting that
its decision rested on "two familiar principles of income taxation."' 1 27
One principle relied upon by the Court was that "partners are taxable
on their distributive or proportionate shares of current partnership in-
come irrespective of whether that income is actually distributed to
them." 12 8 The other was "that income is taxed to the party who earns it
and that liability may not be avoided through anticipatory assignments
of that income."' 2 9 Prior to Bayse, it was clear that a voluntary defer-
ral of income did not fall within the doctrine of assignment of in-
come. 3 ' The question is whether Bayse operated to expand the scope
of that doctrine so as to include voluntary income deferral arrange-
ments. If one focuses on the individual members of the partnership as
the taxable entities in question, it might appear so, for indeed, their
interests in the voluntarily deferred payments were forfeitable and yet
they were taxed on the income on a current basis. It is clear that the
IRS now views the doctrine as so expanded.' 3 ' However, if such an
126. Id at 457.
127. Id at 447.
128. Id
129. Id
130. See notes 118-20 supra and accompanying text. A number of commentators have argued
that the economic benefit rule is more clearly applicable to the Bayse situation and have question-
ed the validity of the Court's application of the assignment of income doctrine. See Shapiro, The
Bayse Decision One Year Later: Judging Its Effect upon Related Areas, 39 J. TAX. 376, 376-77
(1973); Teschner, Bayse Projected- Fringe Benefts and the Supreme Court, 51 TAXES 324, 336
(1973); Note, Taxing Retirement Trust Contributions When Made: United States v. Bayse, 27 STAN,
L. RE. 1249, 1261 (1975). As an application of the economic benefit rule, Bayse is a relatively
easy case. While the partners themselves had no vested interest in the retirement fund, the part-
nership did. As was already examined above, one who has a nonforfeitable right to amounts paid
into a trust fund must include the contributions made in his behalf as current income. See notes
42-45 supra and accompanying text. Hence, the partnership entity was taxable on the amounts
paid into the retirement trust on a current basis, and, under applicable partnership law, amounts
fully earned and payable to the partnership are taxable to the partners whether or not actually
distributed to them. Accordingly, the partners were held accountable for their shares of the de-
flected partnership income for the year in which it was paid over to the trust. Despite the seeming
simplicity of this approach, however, this was not the basis of the Court's analysis. Rather, the
Court resorted to a technical application of the doctrine of assignment of income which, though
probably correct, was unnecessary to a proper disposition of the case.
131. A number of commentators predicted a development along these lines. For the most
part, they agreed that any attempt to rely on Bayse for an alteration of the principles operative in
respect to deferred compensation arrangements would be unjustified. See Shapiro, supra note
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interpretation of Bayse is correct, it would appear that Congress' recent
rejection of Proposed Regulation section 1.61-16 is in direct conflict
with the Supreme Court's decision. It is safe to say, however, that the
issue need not be decided in this way. In fact, the opinion indicates
that the Court intended that its decision be nothing more than an appli-
cation of the "familiar principle" of assignment of income.1
32
The Bayse Court was able to rely on the assignment of income
doctrine because the case involved the diversion of partnership income
to a second person or entity, namely, the ultimate beneficiaries of the
trust. The partnership was not the beneficiary of the trust at all; rather,
the individual partners were. Moreover, those who ultimately would
have taken under the retirement trust arrangement were not necessarily
the same persons who earned the income deflected to the fund.133 In
short, the peculiarities of the arrangement, coupled with the legal status
of the partnership entity, worked an anticipatory assignment of income
taxable to those who earned it on a current basis. Expansive readings
of the case that equate voluntary deferral with assignment of income
are simply wrong.
It has been established that the assignment of income doctrine
does not aid in the implementation of policy objectives in the taxation
of deferred compensation. While Proposed Regulation section 1.61-16
is nonetheless theoretically sound as an application of the doctrine of
constructive receipt, it has been abandoned as a solution. However, a
consideration of the economic benefit rule suggests yet another basis
upon which to implement, at least partially, several policy objectives in
the area of nonqualified deferred compensation arrangements. In the
next section a moderate proposal for change will be made which
utilizes the economic benefit rule. While the proposal would accom-
plish less than Proposed Regulation section 1.61-16, it may carry with it
the benefit of making the proposal more politically feasible.
III. A PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE
A. The Proposal
Proposed Regulation section 1.61-16 would have foreclosed the
availability of the deferred compensation arrangement to most execu-
130, at 377-79; Teschner, supra note 130, at 353. However, at least one writer appeared to share in
the confusion. See Comment, Tax: The Import ofEmployee Involvement in Determining Own
Method of Compensation Reviewed, 58 MINN. L. Rav. 1171, 1177, 1179-80, 1187 (1974).
132. As the Court noted in Bayse. "The entity earning the income-whether a partnership or
an individual taxpayer--cannot avoid taxation by entering into a contractual arrangement
whereby that income is diverted to some other person or entity." 410 U.S. at 449.
133. Id at 445.
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tives. 13 4 Inasmuch as it appears that the executive deferred compensa-
tion arrangement rests on far too strong a footing to be eliminated
outright, this Comment proposes that its use simply be curtailed.
Under current tax law, amounts contributed to a funded nonfor-
feitable arrangement are taxable to the employee on a current basis
nonwithstanding a binding contract to defer payment.13 5 In the case of
the unfunded plan, however, where such amounts are represented by
an unsecured liability of a solvent employer, taxes can be successfully
postponed even though the deferred income is nonforfeitable. This dis-
tinction is grounded in the language of Revenue Ruling 60-31: "A mere
promise to pay, not represented by notes or secured in any way, is not
regarded as a receipt of income within the intendment of the cash re-
ceipts and disbursement method."' 136 The proposal made here chal-
lenges the logic of the present statutory distinction between funded and
unfunded nonqualified plans. It provides that when an amount
credited to an employee on the books of a solvent employer is nonfor-
feitable when credited to his account, or becomes nonforfeitable there-
after, then, at the time his rights so vest, the employee is the recipient of
a present economic benefit taxable to him on a current basis. Income
would be conclusively measured by the amount of the deferred obliga-
tion, and the passage of time before actual receipt of the deferred in-
come would not be taken into account. This treatment of unfunded
plans would parallel current law with respect to funded arrangements.
In the usual case in which the unfunded plan is currently utilized,
there is no appreciable difference between a promise to pay in the
hands of a solvent employer and a similar promise to pay in the hands
of a third-party trustee, escrow agent, or insurance company. 37 It is
clear that, as a practical matter, an employee incurs no great risk when
he receives an unsecured promise to pay from a large solvent corpora-
tion. Thus, employees of large corporations are able both to defer taxa-
tion and to ensure future income by participating in nonforfeitable
unfunded deferred compensation plans that carry little or no risk of
loss. On the other hand, an employee of a smaller enterprise usually
feels the need for greater security in the arrangement to ensure his fu-
ture retirement income so that such an employee must opt for a funded
plan. Thus, he foregoes the opportunity to defer taxation absent condi-
tions of forfeiture restricting the ultimate availability of deferred in-
134. See notes 98-104 supra and accompanying text.
135. I.R.C. §§ 402(b), 403(c).
136. 1960-1 C.B. 174, 177.
137. See McDonald 208.
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come.' 38  As a result, the unfunded nonqualified deferred
compensation plan has become the almost exclusive province of the
highly compensated executive who works for a firm of a size or profit-
ability and stability adequate to assure the "security" of his unsecured
compensation deferral. The proposed change would place all nonfor-
feitable plans on an equal footing, thus eliminating the present law's
preferential treatment of high level employees of large corporations.
To whatever extent there may be some practical differences be-
tween funded and unfunded plans, policy considerations suggest that
these differences do not justify a difference in tax consequences. None-
theless, current tax law persists in recognizing such a distinction, thus
giving greater weight to the peripheral and, for the most part, purely
hypothetical risk associated with unsecured arrangements than to prac-
tical realities and considerations of overall tax fairness. The proposed
regulation would condition the availability of deferred taxation on the
forfeitability of the nonqualified plan, whether funded or unfunded.
Thus, the proposal would operate to replace the current presumption in
favor of executives that the deferred obligation carries no presently tax-
able value, 39 with a contrary presumption that the present value of the
arrangement is the full amount of the deferred obligation.
40
If the views propounded in this Comment were to take the form of
a treasury regulation, it might read as follows:
If under a plan or arrangement (other than a plan or arrange-
ment described in sections 40 1(a), 403(a) or (b) or 405(a)) payment of
an amount of a taxpayer's basic or regular compensation fixed by
contract, statute, or otherwise (or supplements to such compensation
such as bonuses or increases) is deferred to a taxable year later than
that in which it would otherwise be payable, and such plan or ar-
138. Where a fund is deemed necessary to support the employer's promise to pay, deferral is
available only at the price of conditions of forfeiture. I.R.C. §§ 402(b), 403(c).
139. See text accompanying notes 58, 79 & 83 supra.
140. There is a noteworthy parallel to this presumption in the language of section 131 of the
Revenue Act of 1978. Section 131 of the Act concerns state and local government deferred com-
pensation plans. See note 97 supra. If a government plan does not satisfy the eligibility require-
ments of the bill, then in the case of an unfunded salary-reduction deferral agreement executed by
an employee and a state or local government, the amount withheld by the state or local govern-
ment will be presumed to be the present value of the compensation deferred. If future payments
are subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture then they will not be valued until there is no longer a
substantial risk of forfeiture.
Apparently, Congress declined to extend the provisions of section 131 to unfunded nonquali-
fled plans utilized by taxable entities because the considerations differ in the two contexts. See
notes 95-96 supra and accompanying text. In the private sector, for example, unfunded nonquali-
fled deferred compensation arrangements are in many instances limited in their coverage to highly
compensated managerial employees, see notes 28-31 supra and accompanying text, whereas state
and local government plans have heretofore been available on a broad basis to governmental
employees at all levels. See S. REP. ON H.R. 13511, at 71.
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rangement takes the form of an unsecured promise to pay, then, in
any such instance, and provided that the obligor is solvent at the time
the deferral is arranged, the amount of payment so deferred shall be
included in the gross income of the taxpayer in the first taxable year
in which his rights in the promised payments are not subject to a
substantial risk of forfeiture as that term is defined under section
83(c).
In short, the unfunded deferred compensation arrangement-the exec-
utive plan par excellence 14 1-would continue to be available, but
would be subject in every instance to the overriding requirement of
forfeitability. Thus, it would be placed on the same footing as its
funded counterpart that is currently regulated under the terms and con-
ditions of sections 402(b) and 403(c) of the Code. The purpose of the
regulation would be twofold: first, to limit the general availability of
the nonqualified plan, and second, to regulate the unfunded plan fur-
ther so as to undermine its desirability to some extent. As currently
regulated, the unfunded arrangement is particularly attractive because
the sole prerequisite to tax deferral treatment is the agreement to defer
itself.142 Yet, in the words of one commentator, one is "at a loss to
understand why the Commissioner should patiently await the receipt of
the gain if the taxpayer patiently postpones its receipt. It is. . .suffi-
cient that the taxpayer has acquired an unconditional right to be paid
and that the right represents an economic gain." 143 The imposition of a
uniform forfeitability requirement at least would operate to limit the
availability of the unfunded arrangement in a manner capable of ob-
jective scrutiny. 44
B. Legal Justq'cation for the Proposed Treatment of Unfunded
Nonqualfed Deferred Compensation Arrangements.
The economic benefit rule concerns what property or rights actu-
ally received are to be currently taxable as "income."' 45 It will be ar-
gued in this subsection that, in the context of deferred compensation
arrangements, an unfunded and unsecured promise to pay money in
the future made by a solvent employer confers a present economic ben-
141. See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
142. See notes 47, 59-68 supra and accompanying text.
143. Eisenstein, supra note 2, at 407.
144. The failure of Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.61-16 to provide an objective standard for evalu-
ating the taxability of a given deferred compensation arrangement was among its most significant
drawbacks.
145. The first formal enunciation of the economic benefit rule was in 1945, when the Supreme
Court, in Commissioner v. Smith, 324 U.S. 177 (1945), described the income tax laws as "broad
enough to include in taxable income any economic or financial benefit conferred on [any] em-
ployee as compensation, whatever the form or mode by which it is effected." Id at 181.
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efit upon the employee that should be taxable on a current basis.
As was noted earlier, funded deferred compensation plans are reg-
ulated in part by section 83 of the Code, which treats as a currently
taxable economic benefit all "property" received by an employee in the
form of employer payments into such plans. 146 Adoption of the propo-
sal set forth in this Comment would require that unfunded promises to
pay also be regarded as "property" within the meaning of section 83.
However, the recently promulgated regulations under section 83 are
quite specifically to the contrary: "[The term 'property' includes real
and personal property other than money or an unfunded and unsecured
promise to pay money in the future."' 47 Thus, unfunded deferred com-
pensation arrangements remain outside the intended reach of section
83. However, a change in the section 83 regulations would be justified
if the proposal advanced in this Comment is sound. An examination of
the economic benefit doctrine in light of general principles of taxation
and the purposes that they are intended to serve will demonstrate the
fundamental soundness of the proposed change.
1. The Evolution of the Economic Beneft Doctrine. (a) The cash
equivalence rule. As a general rule, a mere promise to pay a specified
sum of money in the future has not been considered the equivalent of
cash in hand. Rather, such unsecured promises have been character-
ized as creating no more than an account receivable in the hands of the
creditor-a nontaxable item to a cash basis taxpayer.14 8 The tradi-
tional rationale for the cash equivalence doctrine is that unless a prom-
ise is secured by property or evidence of property that is transferable
and has a cash value, the income represented by the promise to pay
should not be taxed until received because until such time there is
146. See notes 53-57 supra and accompanying text.
147. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(e) (1978) (emphasis added). This provision was a part of the original
regulations proposed in June, 1971. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.83, 36 Fed. Reg. 10,787 (1971).
Presumably, it was included in order to reflect existing applications of the economic benefit rule
and to allay fears that might otherwise have been aroused as to the intended scope of the new
section. Indeed, the original impetus behind the enactment of section 83 was to effect some solu-
tion to the problems surrounding the taxation of stock options. For the text of section 83 as
accompanied by the Senate Committee Report, S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 119 (1969),
and Conference Committee Report, H.R. REP. No. 782, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 303 (1969), see J.
RABKIN & M. JOHNSON, supra note 44, at 1270-78. See Helpern, The Unexpected Impact of New
Section 83-The Restricted Property Provisions, 24 TAx LAW. 365 (1970-71).
148. See Estate of W.F. Williamson, 29 T.C. 51 (1957), acq. 1958-2 C.B. 8; Harold W. John-
ston, 14 T.C. 560 (1950); Alice G.K. Kleberg, 43 B.T.A. 277 (1941); William A. Hines, 38 B.T.A.
1061 (1938); Dudley T. Humphrey, 32 B.T.A. 280 (1935); Charles C. Ruprecht, 16 B.T.A. 919
(1929), aft'd, 39 F.2d 458 (5th Cir. 1930); John B. Atkins, 9 B.T.A. 140 (1927), aj'd, 36 F.2d 611
(D.C. Cir. 1929). See also Guffey v. United States, 222 F. Supp. 461 (D. Ore. 1963), ajf'd339 F.2d
759 (9th Cir. 1964); James B. Ely, 19 T.C.M. (CCH) 743 (1960).
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neither cash nor property available with which to pay the tax. 149 Nev-
ertheless, although market value and transferability originally were
central concepts of the cash equivalence doctrine, traditional notions of
cash equivalence are eroding.
For example, it was at one time presumed that it would be wholly
inconsistent with the cash basis of reporting to value an unsecured de-
ferred-payment sales contract and to treat that value as money realized
in the year in which the sale was consummated. Only negotiable in-
struments were deemed to be the equivalent of cash.' 50 However,
courts in a more recent line of cases have adopted the position that the
distinction between the so-called "note and mortgage" cases (involving
secured agreements) and the so-called "contract cases" (involving un-
secured arrangements) "appears to be illusory."' 5 ' In Heller Trust v.
Commissioner,l5 2 for example, unsecured deferred payment contracts
executed in connection with the sale of duplexes were valued at fifty
percent of the face value of the buyer's obligation and included in the
vendor's income in the year of sale, notwithstanding a complete ab-
sence of collateral. The court stated:
Petitioners contend that these contracts could not have had an ascer-
tainable fair market value in the particular year received because
they did not receive any negotiable instruments as evidence of any
indebtedness, i.e., notes and mortgages. This court has heretofore
made the observation that such a distinction in some cases appears to
be illusory.' 53
In one case noted with particular frequency, Frank Cowden, Sr.,'s"
a solvent obligor's unsecured obligation to make deferred payments
was held to be worth face value. The court held that if a solvent obli-
gor's unsecured promise to pay is unconditional and assignable, not
subject to set-offs, and of a kind that is frequently transferred to lenders
or investors at a discount not substantially greater than the generally
prevailing premium for the use of money, the face value of such a
promise is taxable as the equivalent of cash received by the taxpayer.'55
149. This reasoning is especially prominent in cases involving sales contracts. See Commis-
sioner v. Garber, 50 F.2d 588 (9th Cir. 1931); Commissioner v. Moore, 48 F.2d 526 (10th Cir.
1931); C.W. Titus, Inc., 33 B.T.A. 928 (1936). See generally 2 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION § 11.05 (1974 ed. & 1978 Cum. Supp.).
150. Bedell v. Commissioner, 30 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1929); Harold W. Johnston, 14 T.C. 560
(1958); Nina J. Ennis, 17 T.C. 465 (1951).
151. Heller Trust v. Commissioner, 382 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1967); Phillips v. Frank, 295 F.2d
629 (9th Cir. 1961); Howard A. Perelman, 41 T.C. 234 (1963).
152. 382 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1967).
153. Id at 681.
154. 32 T.C. 853 (1959), rev'd and remanded, 289 F.2d 20 (5th Cir.), on remand, 20 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1134 (1961).
155. This was the ultimate holding of the case on remand to the tax court. Cowden v. Corn-
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Although the case turns on traditional notions of marketability, the
language of the opinion is nonetheless informative on a larger issue:
"The income tax law deals in economic realities, not legal abstractions,
and the reach of the income tax law is not to be delimited by technical
refinements or mere formalism."' 156 Indeed, the economic realities that
have led to the expansion of the cash equivalence doctrine also have
required courts to abandon traditional nomenclature and to speak in-
stead of the concept of economic benefit.
(b) An expanding concept of economic beneft. The broadening of
the doctrine of cash equivalence coincides with an expanding concept
of income generally.' 57 Section 61(a) provides that gross income en-
compasses "all income from whatever source derived."' 8 It is by now
axiomatic that a liberal construction is to be given this broad definition
of gross income, so that the form which income assumes may often be
entirely dissimilar to cash. 15 9 Mertens discusses the trend away from
more limited notions of cash equivalence and toward generalized no-
tions of economic benefit:
The term [cash equivalence], however, has taken on over the years a
broader meaning. Occasionally it means receipt of benefits and at
other times it may mean a substitute for income or a flow of satisfac-
tion or a benefit accrued. A review of comparatively recent cases
indicates that the old doctrine of equivalent of cash is outmoded and
that an entirely new orientation of this concept is required. One
Court has said that in this day and age income is not restricted to the
receipt of tangibles where there is an actual recognizable benefit, al-
beit intangible, the taxation of which is implicit in the statutory
scheme, and where such benefit is clearly capable of being evaluated
missioner, 20 T.C.M. (CCH) 1134, 1135 (1961). In reversing the original tax court decision, the
court of appeals indicated that the case might have been affirmed were it not for the apparently
determinative emphasis given by the tax court to the voluntary nature of the deferral. 280 F.2d at
23-25. The court of appeals otherwise had no problem with the case as an application of the cash
equivalence doctrine since it noted in dictum "the principle that negotiability is not the test of
taxability. ... Id at 24. Accordingly, on remand the tax court affirmed its earlier holding
"without reference to the willingness and desire of (the payor) to pay the bonus payments in their
entirety in a lump sum in 1951 ...." 20 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1135.
Note that the ultimate holding in Cowden turns largely on its facts. Other cases have dist-
inguished Cowden. See, e.g., Leonard Hyatt, 20 T.C.M. (CCH) 1635 (1961), a 'dper curiam on
other grounds, 325 F.2d 715 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 832 (1964) (nonnegotiable but
transferable contract not taxable to promisee where he did not believe the agreement had a fair
market value and had no intention of marketing it). It should be noted, however, that the payor in
Hyatt was financially unsound.
156. 289 F.2d at 24 (dicta) (footnote omitted).
157. See Knight, supra note 62, at 176.
158. I.R.C. § 61(a).
159. Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243 (1956); Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348
U.S. 426 (1955); Commissioner v. Smith, 324 U.S. 177 (1945).
1491
DUKE LAW JOURNXIAL
on an objective basis.160
In the context of deferred compensation arrangements, the ques-
tion is whether "any economic or financial benefit [was] conferred on
the employee as compensation" in a given taxable year. 61 It is specifi-
cally in the area of employee-compensation arrangements that the prin-
ciple emerged that income may be realized although the property or
evidence of property received is not transferable, provided that the
right to such income is nonforfeitable. Although preceded by a number
of closely parallel cases,' 61 the landmark decision in this area is United
States v. Drescher.1
63
In Drescher, an employer purchased an annuity contract for a key
employee, with the understanding that the employer would retain pos-
session of the policy until the annuitant should reach the age of sixty-
five. The contract was nonassignable and had no cash surrender, sale
or loan value. The court distinguished the nature of the arrangement
from a mere promise to pay and characterized the problem confronting
it as one of valuation rather than taxability.'1' Since the taxpayer
failed to establish the present value of the annuity, the court valued the
policy on the basis of its cost and characterized that value as a taxable
economic benefit, notwithstanding that the nontransferable annuity
contract had no cash surrender or loan value. The court's reasoning is
significant:
It cannot be doubted that in 1939 the plaintiff received as compensa-
tion for prior services something of economic benefit which he had
not previously had, namely, the obligation of the insurance company
to pay money in the future to him or his designated beneficiaries on
the terms stated in the policy. That obligation he acquired in 1939
notwithstanding the employer's retention of possession of the policy
and notwithstanding its nonassignability."6
160. 2 J. MERTENS, supra note 149, § 11.02.
161. J.H. McEwen, 6 T.C. 1018, 1026 (1946).
162. Hackett v. Commissioner, 159 F.2d 121 (1st Cir. 1946); Oberwinder v. Commissioner, 147
F.2d 255 (8th Cir. 1945); Renton K. Brodie, 1 T.C. 275 (1942).
163. 179 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1950).
164. Id at 866.
165. Id at 865. While concurring in the result in Drescher, one member of the court dissented
in part from the court's reasoning. Objecting to what he regarded as an unrealistic attempt to
introduce valuation questions into the discussion of the proper tax treatment of the benefit con-
ferred on the employee, Judge Clarke argued that
[in the fight of the modem conditions of life, the satisfying of the highly natural and
indeed burning desire of most men of middle age to obtain security for their old age and
for their widows at death seems so clearly an economic benefit that I wonder it has been
questioned so much as it has. Nor do I see the need to support this conclusion by look-
ing for some highly theoretical possibility of turning this benefit into immediate dollars
and ents. ...
Hence unless these benefits are now taxed, this small group of top executives will be
given a tax advantage not accruing to less fortunate or less well-advised persons. Such
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The principle established by Drescher has since been accepted univer-
sally by the courts166 and finds its parallel in section 403(c) of the Code,
which conclusively measures income received by an employee on the
basis of the amounts paid by the employer for the annuity in ques-
tion.1 67
2. Applying the Economic Beneft Rule to Unfunded Deferred Com-
pensation Arrangements. It has been established that the transferabil-
ity of a promise to pay is not determinative of its taxability under the
economic benefit doctrine. In the context of annuities, at least, the
characterization turns instead on the abstract benefit of the economic
security represented by the obligation of an insurance company to pay
money to the taxpayer in the future. It is the position of this Comment
that a similar abstract benefit accrues to an employee who receives an
unfunded promise of future payment from a solvent employer. Sup-
port for this contention is found more readily by examining the practi-
cal realities of economic life than by analyzing legal abstractions.
In the context of the unfunded deferred compensation arrange-
ment, taxing items of income only as they are actually received by the
terms of the agreement is an artificial distortion of the taxpayer's in-
come that does not adequately reflect his true annual compensation.
Indeed, the calculated tax advantages incorporated into the taxpayer's
nonforfeitable compensation arrangement, as currently permitted by
law, may be among the most significant financial benefits comprising
his current compensation. Certainly the arrangement is "valuable" to
him. Indeed, it is generally regarded by employers as an important
means of providing key employees with incentive. 6 It can fairly be
concluded that the employer's unfunded promise to pay money in the
future should be taxable as a current economic benefit whenever the
deferred income is nonforfeitable. Inasmuch as this operation of the
economic benefit rule can be postponed by the inclusion of a forfeiture
clause in the deferral contract, no undue hardship would be imposed
taxation should not be confused or rendered abortive by directions for valuation impos-
sible of execution in any realistic way.
Id at 867-69.
166. See Anastasio v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 814 (1977); Charles Wilson, 39 T.C. 362 (1962).
See generally Hyde v. Commissioner, 301 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1962); Commissioner v. Treganowan,
183 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 853 (1950); Sibla v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 422
(1977); Paul L. Frost, 52 T.C. 89 (1969). In Hogan v. United States, 513 F.2d 170 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 836 (1975), the court noted that the "[p]resent vesting of a right, even if its
enjoyment is postponed to the happening of a future event, is an important aspect of gross income
for income tax purposes." 513 F.2d at 174.
167. I.R.C. § 403(c). See Charles Wilson, 39 T.C. 362 (1962). See also cases cited at note 166
supra.
168. See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
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on those for whom the nonqualified deferred compensation arrange-
ment is an important ingredient of an attractive compensation package.
Generally, cash method taxpayers report income for the year in
which it is actually received and not for the year in which the right to
receive it merely accrues. 69 Thus, it might be argued that to character-
ize as an economic benefit an employer's mere promise to pay effec-
tively places a cash method taxpayer on an accrual basis with regard to
the earnings in question. However, the characterization of the fixed
right to future payments as a currently taxable economic benefit
presumes that the taxpayer has realized the face amount of the deferred
obligation just as if he had received it. Thus, the proposed change ar-
guably would be consistent with the cash method of accounting. More-
over, since the cash basis realization requirement is ultimately
"founded on administrative convenience,"' 170 no great injustice would
be committed by positing this result for the limited purpose of dealing
effectively with nonqualified deferred compensation arrangements. Of
course, this argument does not change the fact that, as a practical mat-
ter, the result reached with respect to the cash basis taxpayer would not
differ from the result that would be reached were he on the accrual
basis. Thus, the objection may be validly raised that the taxpayer's
method of accounting would, indeed, be violated. However, that objec-
tion collapses in light of the language of section 446, which provides:
(a) GENERAL RULE.-Taxable income shall be computed
under the method of accounting on the basis of which the taxpayer
regularly computes his income in keeping his books.
(b) ExcEPrONS-If no method of accounting has been regu-
larly used by the taxpayer, or if the method used does not clearly reflect
income, the computation of taxable income shall be made under such
method as, in the opinion of the Secretary, does clearly reflect in-
come. 171
Thus, it is evident that there is nothing particularly inviolate about a
taxpayer's usual method of accounting.
Since the central concern should be to structure the tax conse-
quences of nonqualified deferred compensation arrangements so as to
serve the policy objectives operative in the area, the language of section
446 indicates, if anything, that the result postulated here is the correct
one. Arguably, the cash method does not suitably account for income
deferred by the terms of an employment contract because it does not
take into account economic benefits conferred as well as cash received.
It therefore should be replaced by another method capable of a realistic
169. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.446-1(c)(1) (1973), 1.451-1(a) (1971).
170. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 116 (1940).
171. I.R.C. § 446(a), (b) (emphasis added).
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appraisal of annual income.
The concrete differences between funded and unfunded deferred
compensation arrangements have not been ignored. To be sure, in the
former case, funds are set aside for the employee's exclusive benefit,
while in the latter case the employee stands as a general creditor of the
corporation. Nor may it be said that these differences have never
worked injury on the employee who satisfies himself with his em-
ployer's unsecured promise to pay.' 72 Nonetheless, it is suggested that
the similarities between funded and unfunded plans outweigh the dif-
ferences. Indeed, it is rare that one arrangement will ultimately prove
more or less valuable to an employee than would the other, since the
risks that attach with respect to the unfunded plan are remote. The
subsequent insolvency of a corporate employer-obligor is the exception
and not the rule. Finally, to whatever extent differences between
funded and unfunded arrangements exist in fact, as a matter of policy
these differences should be given less weight than the overall purposes
of tax fairness.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is by now well established that "[a]ny one may so arrange his
affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to
choose that pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a
patriotic duty to increase one's taxes." 173 Thus, to the extent that a
method of tax avoidance is permitted, it can and will be utilized. Often
matters must get out of hand before the need for change becomes ap-
parent. Such were the circumstances that gave rise to Proposed Regu-
lation section 1.61-16.
The laissez-faire policy of Revenue Ruling 60-31, which provides
almost unlimited freedom in the use of unfunded nonqualified deferred
compensation arrangements, should not be permitted to go unchal-
lenged. Therefore, now that the most recent challenge has been effec-
tively defeated, some alternative basis for change in the area of
nonqualified deferred compensation arrangements should be formu-
lated and implemented. The Proposed Regulation would have limited
strictly the availability of unfunded nonqualified plans to the relatively
few instances where they are required by employers for business rea-
sons. Admittedly, the proposal advanced by this Comment falls short
172. See In re Penn Central Transp. Co., 484 F.2d 1300 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951
(1973); Alpert v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 348 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1965) (executives' claims under
unfunded deferred compensation plans given no preference under provisions of the Bankruptcy
Act so that the basis of recovery of claims must be that afforded general creditors of bankrupt).
173. Gregory v. Helvering, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934), aft'd, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
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of accomplishing any such sweeping and direct change. Nonetheless, it
is a step in the direction of implementing tax policy objectives.
Longstanding policy objectives of a fundamental kind-for exam-
ple, that wealth be redistributed in accordance with the general scheme
of the present graduated tax system-are only partially implemented so
long as the law affords tax benefits to arrangements which defeat those
objectives. This is especially problematical if tax policy is to reflect, as
it should, the collective sense of justice of the American people. The
desire to provide equally for the basic needs of all American citizens
operates to disfavor elitist tax advantages and to buttress the demand
for a properly functioning progressive tax structure. Although current
law covering nonqualified deferred compensation plans undoubtedly
plays only a relatively small part in the erosion of the tax structure, it
nonetheless is a problem that can and should be corrected. Deferred
compensation arrangements are, after all, supposed to serve as a means
of retirement planning. It is no part of policy that they be permit-
ted-and even encouraged-to serve the goals of tax avoidance.
Thomas W. Giegerich
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